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RESUMEN 
Este artículo resume y analiza algunas de las contribuciones más importantes al 
gran volumen de publicaciones de filosofía de la tecnología que se ha producido en 
los últimos veinticinco años en Norteamérica, América Central y América del Sur. 
(Se hace un hincapié mayor en Norteamérica.) El artículo subraya la gran variedad de 
standards con que los autores han intentando evaluarla y acaba con un alegato a favor 
de que, sea el que sea el estándar que se invoque, el deseable sería aquel que contri-
buyese a la solución de los problemas de la sociedad tecnológica que se dan en el 
mundo real. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article summarizes and analyzes some of the most important contributions 
to the voluminous literature in philosophy of technology that has been produced dur-
ing the past twenty-five years in North, Central, and South America. (Major focus is 
on North America.) The survey emphasizes the variety of standards the authors have 
attempted to measure up to, and ends with a plea that, whatever the standard invoked, 
an overarching standard ought to be to contribute to the solution of real-world prob-
lems of technological society. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the Americas, North, Central and South, there has been something 
close to an explosion in the literature of philosophy of technology in the last 
twenty-five years. Since I have been the principal editor of most of the publi-
cations of the Society for Philosophy and Technology (SPT) during that time, 
a great deal of the work has passed through my editorial hands. I have always 
tried to assure that contributions to this body of literature meet the highest 
standards. But there is a problem here — namely, that these philosophers try to 
live up to very different kinds of standards.  
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Recently, I attended an international conference in Germany (Karlsruhe, 
May 1997) [Agazzi and Lenk (1998)] on “Advances in the Philosophy of Tech-
nology”. I will repeat here a short definitional survey I gave there. 
I begin with the dominant view in United States philosophy departments at 
the present time. Like scientific advance, analytical philosophers assume, there 
can be philosophical progress, with one contribution building on others, and on 
and on. In the United States, this has become the ideal of academic progress. 
However, once this academic standard was extended, by departmental 
committees and deans, to almost every field of higher learning, it began to 
come under attack. Critics maintain that, when the standard is applied in hu-
manities fields such as literature, history, and the arts — and many of the critics 
would lump philosophy together with other humanistic disciplines — it is totally 
inappropriate. The only measuring rod we can use in these fields is greater and 
greater originality — especially in terms of persuading whatever are per-
ceived to be the relevant audiences. 
A few transcendentalist metaphysicians and theologians object to both 
the strict (progressive) academic standard and the much broader “originality” 
standard; they say both are retrogressive chasing after increasingly trivial mi-
nutiæ. The only real progress moves in the opposite direction, toward more 
and more comprehensive syntheses — ever closer approaches to truth or beauty 
or goodness (sometimes capitalized as Truth, Beauty, and Goodness).  
There are also “right-side-up” dialectical-materialist neo-Hegelians — and 
others — who insist on real social progress as the only appropriate standard.  
Finally, still others insist on what I would call an Aristotelian model, rec-
ognizing that academic fields are divided along disciplinary lines, each with its 
own standards. At least some of the sciences meet the criterion of progress 
within limited domains; but most intellectual endeavors can make only “inten-
sive” or “qualitative” progress, providing no more than a deeper appreciation of, 
or new insights into, old truths, traditional arts and crafts, and also such newer 
methodologies as those associated with computers and other new technologies. 
If we now look at what has been accomplished in philosophy of technol-
ogy in the Americas in recent decades, how should we judge it using these stan-
dards? 
 
 
II. NORTH AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
A1. Analytical Approaches (I) 
Nearly everyone agrees that the benchmark contribution to North 
American philosophy of technology is Carl Mitcham’s Thinking through 
Technology [Mitcham (1994)]. And Mitcham’s main contribution is taken to 
be his conceptual framework of (a) technological knowledge and (b) 
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technological volition leading to (c) the technological activities of making 
and using (d) technological objects or artifacts (in the broadest sense). About 
this, Mitcham says that “a framework should be both definite enough to 
provide some guidance and open enough to allow for adjustments and the 
possibility of winding up with new ideas. If it is to be philosophical”, he 
adds, “it should raise philosophical questions while remaining hospitable to 
different responses to those questions” [Mitcham (1994), p. 160]. And he 
thinks his framework (which he tentatively links to Aristotle’s Categories) 
meets these standards. 
Two things need to be said about Mitcham’s analysis. One is that a 
number of analytical philosophers think the approach is fundamentally wrong-
headed (however well intentioned); I will return to them in a moment (section 
A2, below). But the other side of the coin is that Mitcham’s framework does 
build on earlier work. 
First, Mitcham’s analysis picks up on a number of European-based at-
tempts to distinguish technology from science and to reassess the once-
dominant view about the relationship between the two (assuming they are 
somehow distinct). The best known North American interpreter of Martin 
Heidegger’s critique of technological culture is Albert Borgmann [Borgmann 
(1984), (1992)]. His “device paradigm” description of modern, technology-
driven consumer culture, with its call to citizens of technological cultures to 
return to “focal things and practices”, has become a mainstay of North 
American philosophy of technology. Some even say it has generated the first 
genuine tradition — with younger scholars (for example, Strong (1995)) ex-
panding on the work of their mentors — in North American philosophy of 
technology. (A Borgmann Festschrift, edited by Higgs, Light, and Strong, 
should be published in late 1998 or early 1999.) 
Heidegger was also an influence on Don Ihde [Ihde (1979), (1983), 
(1990), (1993)], perhaps the most prolific of American philosophers of tech-
nology. But a stronger influence on him was Edmund Husserl, and Ihde’s 
most common focus has been on the way culture — including technological 
culture and its many instruments and gadgets — shapes perception. Ihde 
thinks of himself, thus, as a phenomenologist, and much of his work focuses 
on epistemological concerns. Ihde’s phenomenology of technology is widely 
esteemed, and his version of a Husserlian approach is both unique and 
uniquely American. But it is not analytical in any narrow sense either.  
The same is true of Langdon Winner [Winner (1977), (1986)]. The title 
of his first major book, Autonomous Technology, owes much to another 
European critic of technological culture, Jacques Ellul, though Winner gives 
the theory of autonomous technology a decidedly non-European turn. (In this 
pairing, Mitcham learned much more from Ellul than from Winner.) What 
Winner has become famous for is the theory he calls “technological politics” 
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— that technologies should be critiqued not for their uses or misuses, but for 
the political structures built right into them — especially their authoritarian 
or anti-democratic features.  
Although Mitcham’s (re-)definition of technology depends, to some ex-
tent, on all of these philosophers, European and North American, he develops 
his own framework most immediately from earlier analytical frameworks 
provided by Robert McGinn [McGinn (1978), (1991)] and Stephen Kline 
[Kline (1985)]. What McGinn, Kline, and Mitcham are attempting to do is 
provide a set of characteristics that uniquely single out the institution of 
(modern) technology, distinguishing it from such other modern institutions as 
science, art, religion, and sports. And Mitcham’s is the most comprehensive 
of such attempts.  
However, it is possible to question whether or not the highlighted char-
acteristics really differentiate modern technology from its closest neighbor 
institution, modern technologized science. (See Cordero (1998), writing from 
an analytical perspective; also Barnes, Bloor, and Henry (1996), representing 
a sociological perspective.) 
 
A2. Analytical Approaches (II) 
A totally different sort of analytical approach to philosophy of technol-
ogy can also be taken. It is one that is unconcerned about characteristics al-
leged to differentiate between scientific and technological institutions and 
practices. Instead, authors such as Shrader-Frechette [Shrader-Frechette (1980), 
(1991), (1993)] and Cranor [Cranor (1993)] take as a starting point actual meth-
odologies used by scientific-technical experts — their favorite example is 
cost-benefit analysis; they then critique those methods, employing the stan-
dards of the strictest methods borrowed from philosophy of science. 
(Shrader-Frechette adds to this an ethical critique, challenging risk assessors 
to be more equitable and broadly democratic.) These contributions to North 
American philosophy of technology, without doubt, measure up to even the 
strictest standards of academic progress. 
 
B. A Postmodern Critique 
North Americans have joined in the critique of science and technology 
— or “technoscience” — in the name of “postmodernism”. One particularly 
striking example of this approach can be seen in Narrative Experiments: The 
Discursive Authority of Science and Technology [Ormiston and Sassower 
(1989)]. The focus is clear in the subtitle: neither technology nor science 
should be accepted as authoritative on its own terms. The two go together, as 
“technoscience,” and its/their authority has been won in a discursive struggle 
within a cultural and linguistic context. What is more, science and technol-
ogy have won out over competing narratives at a particular point (really, 
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many points) in history; and their authority was achieved simultaneously 
with the legitimation of their modes of discourse. Finally, these modes of 
discourse are no more nor less cyclical than patterns in the humanities. At 
their most provocative, Ormiston and Sassower say that science and technol-
ogy are not separate; they fall within the class of humanities disciplines or 
discourses. 
It is against views of this sort that the most vociferous defenders of sci-
entific and technological objectivity have railed [Gross and Levitt (1994)]. 
According to these critics of postmodern critiques, abandoning the standard 
of scientific objectivity does incredible disservice to legions of well-meaning 
— and successful — scientists and engineers. But there are also less extreme 
critics of the critical view, even within the broad range of science and tech-
nology criticisms labeled “postmodern,” and whose advocates tend to accept 
standards of progress less strict than the strictest of academic standards. (See, 
for a summary of such views, Rouse (1996).)  
 
C. Metaphysical Critiques 
Above, I listed Carl Mitcham among analytical critics of technology, 
along with neo-Heideggerians like Albert Borgmann or phenomenologists 
like Don Ihde. But the truth of the matter is that almost all of the philosophers 
of technology in North America who have been strongly influenced by Hei-
degger or Ellul are not primarily interested in definitional or conceptual issues. 
Their true focus is on the place of philosophy, understood traditionally in a 
sense that gives primacy to metaphysics, within a world dominated by means 
rather than ends. They are culture critics, attempting to comprehend the 
world-taken-for-granted in mundane thinking. This is the only way to under-
stand Heidegger’s “existential” claims about a “framework” that constrains 
(modern) “technical thinking” — or, similarly, to understand Ellul’s claims 
about “Technique” as the idol of our age [Lovekin (1991)]. 
Mitcham (1994) ends his book with references to a “romantic” Heideg-
ger: “In Heidegger’s existential analysis there is a paradox, that the personal 
that is revealed through the technical is also undermined thereby” [Mitcham 
(1994), p. 297]. Although Mitcham recognizes “inherent weaknesses” in the 
romantic critique of technology, he clearly wishes they could be overcome.  
What kind of standards does a metaphysical (or Heideggerian-existen-
tial) critique of technology invoke? Analytical philosophers accuse such 
metaphysical thinkers of retreating to the past. Hegel-oriented philosophers 
(see Verene (1997)) claim that a “comprehensive” approach is the standard 
that philosophers have always appealed to, down through the ages of West-
ern philosophy.  
 
D. Ethics and Technology 
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I would like to, but it would be impossible to provide a brief summary here 
of the vast North American literature on applied ethics that touches on technol-
ogy — from biomedical ethics to research ethics to computer ethics and envi-
ronmental ethics. In the USA, engineering ethics [Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins 
(1995)] and environmental ethics have suffered the same fate as applied ethics 
generally; that is, “purists” have tended to question the academic credentials of 
most (some would say all) engineering and environmental ethicists. They are, the 
critics say, not doing “real ethics,” but a less worthy application. (For a counter-
proposal in environmental ethics, see Light and Katz (1995).) 
 
E. Political Philosophy and Technology 
Once North American philosophers began to take technology seriously, 
the traditional view of technology as applied was rarely viewed as a serious 
alternative. Langdon Winner [Winner (1977), (1986)], mentioned earlier, 
was one of the earliest philosophers to make this point.  
Among North Americans writing about the politics of technology in the 
period covered here, I will refer to only two groups. 
Marxists — and especially neo-Marxists influenced by Marcuse — argued 
that the ills of contemporary society, while they are related to technology and the 
social demands of living in a technological society, call for revolution if they are 
to be solved. 
One neo-Marxist philosopher influenced by Marcuse, Andrew Feenberg 
[Feenberg (1991)], has questioned this, arguing that it is possible to spell out 
certain conditions under which we might achieve a more just, worker-oriented 
society without revolution. 
Arguing for social-democratic evolution rather than socialist revolu-
tion, North American philosophers of technology following in the footsteps 
of the pre-eminent American Pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey, have put 
their faith in piecemeal social reform as the way to keep technological ills 
under democratic social control. Larry Hickman [Hickman (1990)] is the 
leading spokesperson for this group. He wrestles with (and against) all the 
“metaphysical” thinkers mentioned earlier, arguing that the right kind of “in-
strumental rationality” can avoid the excesses of both the left and the right in 
dealing with technosocial problems.  
My own work [Durbin (1992)] falls within this tradition of piecemeal 
social reform as a remedy for technosocial ills. What I appeal to is the suc-
cess that progressive activists have had, and the hope that their success will 
continue in the future. 
What sort of standards do praxis-oriented philosophers of technology 
appeal to? We tend to recall Karl Marx’s statement that he was not so much 
interested in understanding the world as in changing it. Most Marx-based 
philosophers insist on wholesale, even worldwide, revolutionary change; we 
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progressives will be satisfied if a reasonable number of local technosocial ills 
can be dealt with successfully, at least temporarily. Any more sweeping 
changes must start there. 
 
 
III. LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
A. Parallels to North America 
Carl Mitcham [Mitcham (1993)] has produced an invaluable summary 
of work in the philosophy of technology in Spanish speaking countries. A major 
portion of the work he has collected as representative of Latin America repre-
sents a strong parallel with recent North American philosophy of technology. 
In Chile, Mitcham cites contributions by a Heideggerian, a neo-Marxist, 
and an analytically-inclined philosopher trained in North America. For Costa 
Rica, Mitcham includes philosophers trained in North America or strongly 
influenced by North Americans. I would hazard a guess that these philoso-
phers, if asked, would want their work judged by standards similar to those 
invoked in North American universities. 
 
B. A More Concrete Focus 
Other Latin American philosophers have been more concrete. In 1995, 
it was proposed that the Society for Philosophy and Technology should hold 
its next international conference (1996) in Mexico. The Mexican organizers 
chose to focus on a practical topic, “Technology, Economic Development, 
and Sustainability”. The resulting proceedings volume [Martínez Contreras, 
Gutiérrez Lombardo, and Durbin (1997)] includes over a dozen contributions 
— just counting those by Mexicans — that are directly or indirectly related 
to the theme. Some of these philosophers focus on the concept of sustainabil-
ity, others on ethics and sustainability, and still others on a variety of topics re-
lated to development and the environment (including women’s issues). 
Recognizing that each has his or her particular focus, it seems safe to 
say that the standard by which many of them would want to be judged is not 
academic. What they are concerned about is whether, and to what extent, phi-
losophy can contribute to the solution of the environmental problems that 
have accompanied economic development initiatives in their country. (Other 
authors focused on other countries, not only in Latin America but throughout 
the Spanish speaking world.) 
 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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What lessons might we draw from this survey? The most obvious les-
son is that philosophers of technology, in both North America and Latin 
America, seldom have academic rigor as their primary focus. Some good 
work, following the lines of academic philosophy of science, does exist. But 
many more of these philosophers would prefer to be judged by other stan-
dards, and quite a few are critical of academic standards in the first place. 
For my part, I believe the most important standard for all philosophers 
of technology ought to be practical. Will the philosophical work contribute, 
in any significant way, to the genuine solution of urgent techno-social prob-
lems? The urgency of these problems is very great, and I think we all have a 
social responsibility, and a golden opportunity, to help deal with the problems. 
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